Kapitel 7 von 31 · Teil 2 von 2 · ca. 11 Min.
Of Justice, Customs, and Prejudices
Justice is subject to dispute, power is easily recognised and cannot be disputed. Thus we cannot give power to justice, because power has arraigned justice, saying that justice is unjust, and she herself truly just; so since we are unable to bring about that what is just should be strong, we have made the strong just.
The sole universal rules are the laws of the country in ordinary affairs, and the law of the majority in others. And this comes from the power which is in them.
Thus it comes that kings, whose power is of another kind, do not follow the majority of their ministers.
No doubt equality of goods is just, but since they are unable to bring about that power should obey justice, people have judged it right to obey power; not being able to add power to justice they have justified power, so that justice and power should coalesce, and peace, the sovereign good, result.
Do we follow the majority because they have more reason? No; but because they have more power.
Do we follow ancient laws and opinions because they are more sound? No; but because they stand alone and take from us the root of diversity.
Summum jus, summa injuria.
The way of the majority is the best way, because it is plain, and has power to make itself obeyed; yet it is the opinion of the least able.
If men could have done so, they would have placed power in the hands of justice, since we cannot deal with power as we please, because it is a tangible quality, while justice is a spiritual quality of which we dispose as we please, they have placed justice in the hands of power, and thus that is called just which we are forced to obey.
Thence arises the right of the sword, for the sword gives a true right.
Otherwise we should see violence on one side and justice on the other. The end of the twelfth Provincial.
Thence the injustice of the Fronde, which raises its so-called justice against power.
It is not the same in the Church, for there is true justice and no violence.
Injustice.—That presumption should be joined to insignificance is extreme injustice.
Tyranny consists in the desire of universal rule outside its sphere.
There are different societies, in which are the strong, the fair, the judicious, the devout, in which each man rules at home, not elsewhere. Sometimes they meet, and the strong and the fair contend for the mastery, foolishly, for their mastery is each in a different kind. They do not agree, and their fault is that each aims at universal dominion. None can obtain this, not even power, which is of no avail in the realm of the wise; she is only mistress of our external actions.
Tyranny.—Thus the following expressions are false and tyrannical: “I am beautiful, therefore I should be feared; I am strong, therefore I should be loved. I am....”
Tyranny is the wishing to have in one way what can only be had in another. Divers duties are owing to divers merits, the duty of love to the pleasant, of fear to the strong, of belief to the wise.
These duties should be paid, it is unjust to refuse them, unjust also to require others. In the same way it is false and tyrannous to say, “He is not strong, therefore I will not esteem him; he is not clever, therefore I will not fear him.”
It is necessary that men should be unequal. True; but that being granted, the door is open, not only to the greatest domination, but to the greatest tyranny.
It is necessary to relax the mind a little, but that opens the door to extreme dissipation.
We must mark the limits.—There are no fixed boundaries in these matters, law wishes to impose them, but the mind will not bear them.
Mine, Thine.—“This is my dog,” say poor children, “that is my place in the sunshine.” Here is the beginning and the image of the usurpation of the whole earth.
Good birth is a great advantage, for it gives a man a chance at the age of eighteen, making him known and respected as an ordinary man is on his merits at fifty. Here are thirty years gained at a stroke.
It is the result of power and not of custom. For those who are able to originate are few, the greater number will only follow, and refuse glory to those inventors who seek it by their inventions. And if they persist in wishing to gain glory, and in despising those who do not originate, the others will give them ridicule and would fain give them blows. Let no one then pride himself on this subtle capacity, or else let him keep his content to himself.
The reason of effects.—It is strange that men would not have me honour a man clothed in brocade, and followed by seven or eight footmen! Yet he will have them give me the strap if I do not salute him. This custom is a power. It is the same with a horse in fine trappings compared with another. It is odd that Montaigne does not see what difference there is, wonders that we find any, and asks the reason. “Indeed,” he says, “how comes it,” etc....
When power attacks craft, when a mere soldier takes the square cap of a first president, and flings it out of the window.
Injustice.—Men have found no means to gratify their sensuality without wrong to others.
The greatness of man even in his sensuality, to have known how to extract from it an admirable code, and to have drawn from it a picture of love to others.
Greatness.—The reasons of effects mark the greatness of man, in having formed so fair an order out of sensuality.
The reason of effects.—Sensuality and power are the source of all our actions; sensuality causes those which are voluntary, power the involuntary.
From sensuality men have found and drawn excellent rules of policy, of morals, and of justice.
But after all, this evil root of man, this figmentum malum, is only hidden, it is not removed.
All men by nature hate each other. They have used sensuality as best they could to make it serve the public weal, but this is only a feint, and a false image of charity, for at bottom it is but hate.
To pity the unfortunate is not contrary to sensuality, rather is it easy to render this evidence of friendship, and to gain the reputation of a tender heart, without giving.
The people have very sound opinions, for instance:
1. In having preferred diversion and hunting to poetry. The half educated deride this, and are triumphant over the folly of the world, but the people are right by a reason which the others do not understand.
2. In distinguishing men by outward marks, as birth or wealth. The world is again triumphant in showing how unreasonable this is, yet it is thoroughly reasonable. Savages laugh at an infant king.
3. In taking offence at a blow, or in desiring glory so strongly.
But it is very desirable, on account of the other essential goods which are joined to it, and a man who has received a blow without resenting it is overwhelmed with abuse and indignity.
4. In working for an uncertainty, in going on a sea voyage, in walking over a plank.
Sound opinions of the people.—Civil wars are the greatest of all evils. They are certain, if we try to reward desert, for all will say they deserve. The evil to fear from a fool who succeeds by right of birth, is neither so great nor so certain.
Sound opinions of the people.—To be well dressed is not altogether foolish, for it proves that a great number of people work for us. It shows by our hair, that we have a valet, a perfumer, etc.; by our band, our thread, our trimming, etc. Now it is not merely superficial nor simply outward show to have many arms at our disposal.
The more arms we have the stronger we are. To be well dressed is to show our power.
The reason of effects.—Continual alternation of pro and con.
We have then shown that man is frivolous, by the estimation he has of non-essentials. And all these opinions are destroyed. We have next shown that all these opinions were perfectly sound, and that thus all these frivolities being well founded, the people are not so frivolous as is said. And thus we have destroyed the opinion which destroyed that of the people.
But we must now destroy this last proposition, and show that it remains always true that the people are frivolous, though its opinions are sound, because it does not feel the truth where it is, and placing it where it is not, its opinions are always very false and very unsound.
The reason of effects.—It is, then, true to say that all men are under an illusion, for even though the opinions of the people be sound, they are not so as they hold them, for they think that truth is where it is not. Truth is indeed in their opinions, but not at the point where they imagine it.
Thus, it is true that we should honour men of birth, but not because good birth is in itself an advantage, etc.
The reason of effects.—Gradation. The people honours persons of high birth. The half-educated despise them, saying that birth is not a personal, but a chance advantage. The educated honour them, not from the motives of the people, but from another motive. Devout persons of more zeal than knowledge despise them, in spite of that consideration which makes them honoured by the educated, because they judge by a new light arising from their piety. But true Christians honour them by a still higher light. So there is a succession of opinions for and against, according to the measure of our light.
How rightly do men distinguish by exterior rather than by interior qualities! Which of us twain shall take the lead? Who will give place to the other? The least able? But I am as able as he is. We should have to fight about that. He has four footmen, and I have but one; that is something which can be seen; there is nothing to do but to count; it is my place to yield, and I am a fool if I contest it. So by this means we remain at peace, the greatest of all blessings.
Deference is shown by submitting to personal inconvenience. This is apparently foolish but really just, for it is to say, “I would certainly put myself to inconvenience did you need it, since I do so when it can be of no service to you.” Respect, moreover, is for the purpose of marking distinctions of rank. Now if it showed respect to be seated in an arm-chair, we should pay respect to every body, and thus no distinction would be made, but being put to inconvenience we distinguish very well.
The reason of effects.—We should keep our own secret thoughts, and judge of all by those, while speaking like every one else.
King and tyrant.—I too will have my secret thoughts. I will take care on every journey.
The reason of effects.—Epictetus. Those who say “You have a headache,” this is not the same thing. We are assured of health, and not of justice, and indeed his own was folly.
Yet he believed it demonstrable when he said, “it is either in our power or it is not.”
But he did not see that it is not in our power to regulate the heart, and he was wrong to draw this conclusion from the fact that some were Christians.
The reason of effects.—It is owing to the weakness of man that so many things are esteemed beautiful, as to be well skilled in playing the lute.
It is only an evil because of our weakness.
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